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Abstract 
Tariff protection and nontariff barriers are higher in developing countries than in industrial nations. 
The tendency of protection to decline with a higher level of development can be explained by the role 
of import axes in government revenue, by export pessimism, and by differential treatment of develop- 
ing countries under GATE. 
Protection against imports is a burden on the export sector. Trade liberalization has important effects 
on economic growth and factor productivity. Recent programs of trade liberalization are implemented 
together with complementary macroeconomic policies to enhance the possibility of sustaining trade 
policy reforms to be sustained. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence points to a phase of industrialization as indis- 
pensable for economic development in most countries, the efficiency of which is 
closely connected with the design of trade policies. 
The review of trade policies in developing countries in Section 1 includes the 
extent of tariff protection and of nontariff barriers (NTBs), the escalation of tariffs, 
and the connection between the level of protection and the stage of development. 
Section 2 offers an explanation for the extent of protection in developing coun- 
tries. Explaining factors include the various types of development design, the role 
of government revenue, and that of balance of payments difficulties, and the pref- 
erential treatment of developing countries in world trade. 
The effects of protection policies are reviewed in Section 3. It includes a general 
introduction on the efficiency of resource allocation as influenced by protectionist 
measures. The costs of protection are further analyzed using the concepts of effec- 
tive protection, of domestic resource costs, and that of true protection. Finally, an 
overview is given of the experience of developing countries with design and imple- 
mentation of policies for trade liberalization. 
A summary of the main findings concludes the article in Section 4. 
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1. The structure of protection in developing countries 
1.1. Extent 
A recent and comprehensive survey of trade control measures in developing coun- 
tries is given in UNCTAD (1990). The survey covers 62 developing countries, and 
in terms of measures it includes, tariffs, other charges, customs receipts, and non- 
tariff measures (NTMs).~ The main results are represented in Table 1. 
For all products the 1985 trade-weighted average tariff is 21.3 percent, with similar 
figures for the two broad subcategories: primary products and manufactures. Total 
charges including next to tariffs, customs surcharges, stamp taxes, and other fiscal 
charges, are on average one third higher than the average tariff. With respect to 
the nontariff measures, the unweighted frequency average for all products is 41.6 
Table 1. Tariffs and nontariff barriers in developing countries, 1985. 
Product Group SITC 
Tariff Barriers Nontariff Barriers 
Percentages a Frequencies a
Total Quantitative All 
Tariffs Charges Restrictions Measures 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
All Products 0-8 21.3 28.8 41.6 62.3 
Primary Products 0-4, 67, 68 19.2 26.4 43.3 63.8 
Manufactures 5-8, less 67, 68 22.3 30.0 40.1 61.0 
Food Products 0, 1, 22, 4 25.6 33.6 49.5 67.4 
Vegetables and fruit 05 35.3 45.2 53.1 69.1 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 07 31.7 41.7 44.8 65.0 
Agricultural raw materials 2 less 22, 27, 28 16.2 23.7 35,3 58.4 
Mineral fuels 3 15.3 21.9 37.1 61.2 
Ores and metals 27, 28, 67, 68 15.2 22.0 34.1 57.9 
Chemical products 5 16.9 23.6 39.2 61.1 
Fertilizers 56 4.7 10.1 43.8 66.8 
Diverse manufactures 6, 8 less 67, 68 30.1 39.2 42.2 61.8 
Cork and wood products 63 31.2 42.1 38.2 61.2 
Newsprint 6411 12.2 18.7 41.6 61.8 
Textiles 6511 34.5 44.7 43.9 65.2 
Furniture 82 43.9 54.4 54,1 67.0 
Clothing 84 47.1 60.4 56.6 71.0 
Footwear 85 39.3 50.8 50.4 66.2 
Scientific instruments 87 14.8 21.1 32.6 56.3 
Machinery and equipment 7 20.6 28.0 38.7 60.2 
Color TV receivers 7611 41.4 51.0 52.8 70.5 
Passenger cars 7810 51.9 66.8 65.7 80.0 
Parts of aircraft 7929 9.0 14.5 32.0 57.6 
Source: UNCTAD (1990). 
aSee Appendix 1 for country coverage and definitions of trade barriers. Tariffs and total charges repre- 
sent trade-weighted averages. Nontariff barriers are non-weighted frequency averages. 
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percent for quantitative restrictions alone and 62.3 percent for all measures. As 
in the case of tariffs, the average NTM-coverage for primary products and for man- 
ufactures is close to the average for all products. 
At a lower level of aggregation, however, there are marked differences in protec- 
tion among product groups. Within primary products, tariffs and total charges are 
much lower for raw materials and mining products than for food products; to a lesser 
extent the same holds for NTM-coverage for these product groups. Within manufac- 
tures, tariff protection on clothing, footwear, furniture, and textiles is particularly 
high, but it is relatively low on fertilizers, aircraft parts, and scientific instruments. 
In more general terms, UNCTAD (1990) concludes, that both the level and struc- 
ture of import taxation and NTMs in developing countries present a barrier to the 
expansion of intradeveloping countries' trade, by penalizing products that, due to 
resource endowment (agro-based consumer goods) and relative factor endowment 
(manufactured labor-intensive goods), have gained these countries' highest com- 
parative advantages on the world market. 
Regarding the nature of NTMs in developing countries, UNCTAD (1990) found 
that these measures are on the whole nondiscriminatory. On the basis of a detailed 
investigation involving 50 developing economies, it was found that legislation on 
NTMs very rarely specifies individual partner countries and that the NTMs most 
commonly used are of a general nature and are not pointed at individual suppliers. 
The NTMs involved are licensing, advanced import deposits, and central bank 
authorizations. 2 
Since tariffs and NTMs both have the effect of restricting imports, it could be 
expected that the two types of measures are used as alternatives. On the other 
hand, especially in developing countries, tariffs serve also as a source of govern- 
ment revenue, whereas NTMs are meant to control the amount of imports, such 
as when there is a scarcity of foreign exchange. These different purposes may 
require that both types of measures be used in combination. Erzan et al. (1989) 
have investigated this aspect in particular and conclude that tariffs for products 
where NTMs are also applied are on average 45 percent higher than those for 
products without NTMs. This leads to the conclusion that tariffs and NTMs are 
being used in combination rather than as alternatives. This finding is confirmed 
across sectors, most markedly for iron, steel, other metals, and machinery, where 
tariff on products with NTMs were 70 to 80 percent above the tariffs for the same 
type of goods not covered by NTMs. 3 
1.2. Escalation 
Average tariffs for primary products and for manufactures do not deviate much 
according to the figures in Table 1. At a more detailed level, however, tariffs have 
a clear tendency to increase with the stage of processing. This escalation of tariffs 
has been investigated in detail for the structure of protection in developing coun- 
tries by Laird and Yeats (1990). Some of the results are presented in Table 2 and 
suggest a high degree of tariff escalation in developing countries, especially for 
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Table 2. Escalation of tariffs in developing countries. 
Tariffs 
Trade-Weighted in Percentages 
Processing Chain Leather Wood Wool Cotton iron 
Raw Materials 1.5 2.5 4.0 1.0 0.1 
Semirnanufactures 15.9 6.4 17.8 22.3 5.9 
Finished Products 46.2 42.1 27.6 30.9 24.2 
Source: Laird and Yeats (1990). 
production chains in which these countries have a comparative advantage. How- 
ever, in countries with no domestic production of the raw material concerned, esca- 
lation of tariffs in the particular product chain is usually not found. 
Laird and Yeats (1990) simulate the effects of a preferential removal of tariffs (and 
their escalation) among developing countries and conclude that there is a poten- 
tial rise of intradeveloping country trade of 14 percent above existing trade levels 
for nonpetroleum products. 4 
With respect to escalation in protection, Finger and Laird (1987) comment that 
such protection would attract processing activities to a country if it were the only 
one imposing it; however, in actuality when many countries--both developed and 
developing--apply escalation, the effects will cancel each other. 5 Furthermore, in 
the aggregate, escalation in protection becomes a burden on commodity-producing 
and on commodity-using sectors in all countries. As a consequence, the simultane- 
ous reduction of protection in both developed and developing economies would 
be a positive sum game. 
1.3. Protection and the level of development 
The suggestion in the previous section is that developing countries can be taken 
as a homogeneous group when it comes to the application of trade policy meas- 
ures. There are, however, marked differences among developing countries in this 
respect. This is apparent, for instance, in Table 3, where the developing countries 
are classified according to the level of GDP per capita. Customs receipts represent- 
ing tariffs, other charges actually collected, and NTMs have a clear tendency to 
decrease with the level of development. In developing countries with a per capita 
income of less than $500 (in 1987) customs receipts are 30 percent of the import 
value and NTMs are applied with a frequency of 66 percent; these values are, 
respectively, a factor 20 and 10 higher than for the developing countries with an 
income per capita of over $5000. This latter group of developing countries applies 
trade policy measures to an extent comparable to those in the industrial countries. 
On average, customs receipts in developing countries are nine times as high as 
in industrial countries, and NTMs are four times higher. 
Within the income per capita range $500 to $1500, Erzan et al. (1989) distin- 
guished two separate groups of developing countries around an income per capita 
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Table 3. Protection and the level of development. 
Country Group a Number 
Customs Receipts Nontariff Measures 
in Percentages a Frequencies in Percentages a
1987 1987 
Developing countries 62 14.8 60+9 
with GDP/capita 
° below $500 22 30.0 65.9 
• $500-$1500 25 18.7 58.7 
• $1500-$5000 9 8.9 35.6 
® $5000 and more 6 1.6 7.1 
Industrial countries 10 1.7 13.9 
Source: UNCTAD (1990). 
aCustoms receipts as a trade-weighted average in percentages of the value of imports. Nontariff measures 
are an unweighted average of frequencies expressed in percentages. Appendix 1 gives details on 
coverage of countries and trade measures. 
of $1000. It turned out that the less developed country group was somewhat less 
protective than the higher developed group both for tariff protection and NTMs. 6 
Notwithstanding these important differences in protection levels among the 
various groups of developing countries, it was concluded that the product pattern 
of protection (Table 1) was largely the same, both for tariffs and NTMs (Erzan et 
aL 1989). 
Comparing the data in Tables 1 and 3, it follows that customs receipts in develop- 
ing countries amount to 14.8 percent of imports, which is only half of the calculated 
average rate for tariffs and other charges of 28.8 percent. This indicates that a sub- 
stantial amount of the potential duty revenue is not collected (UNCTAD 1990). 
1.4. Variation among individual developing countries 
Recently the IMF (1992) has documented the current structure of trade regimes 
in developing countries. The 36 countries studied were classified according to four 
types of trade regimes: three countries were classified as having a system of tight 
control on trade, and eight countries as having significant control; of the 25 other 
countries, 16 were classified as relatively open and nine as openF From the details 
in Appendix 2 it can be seen that quantitative restrictions on trade are virtually 
absent in the nine open countries and very moderately applied in the 16 countries 
classified as relatively open. In the three countries with tight control, quantitative 
restrictions are applied to well over 50 percent of total imports. Regarding tariffs 
and other charges, the IMF (1992) observes that only in the nine open countries 
is this type of protection low, whereas in the 27 other countries it remains high. 
These data testify to the substantial variation in trade regimes among developing 
countries. 
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2. Explaining the level of protection 
2.1. Development design 
The previous section found that protection in developing countries is considerably 
higher than in industrial countries. Usually (IMF 1992), the high level of protection 
in developing countries is connected with the adoption in the 1960s by many of 
these countries of import substitution as the strategy for development o follow, 
which in turn is regarded to have been based on export pessimism. The reason- 
ing can be disentangled as follows. 
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) considered the terms of trade of primary prod- 
ucts relative to manufactures and concluded that these were declining, beyond 
the control of developing countries' policies. Factors in this decline were the relative 
low elasticities of demand for primary products, the increasing efficiency in their 
use as raw materials, and the invention and increased use of synthetic substitutes. 
Recently, Ardeni and Wright (1992) confirmed the declining terms of trade for pri- 
mary products to be valid for the whole century up to 1988 and concluded that 
this trend cannot be explained away, as in cases of earlier studies, as a spurious 
regression phenomenon. 
Since at the time, raw materials were the major export products of developing 
countries, Prebisch (1950) concluded that diversification of exports to include man- 
ufactures was necessary, if an ever widening gap between rich and poor nations 
was to be avoided. This in turn required the industrialization of the developing 
economies to some degree. 
Of course, apart from export considerations, industrialization has long been re- 
garded as an indispensable phase in economic development. The work of Kuznets 
(1971) and Lewis (1978) for instance indicates that economic development repre- 
sented by rising productivity of labor in the economy as a whole, would require 
industrial activities and eventually services, absorbing labor from low productivity 
occupations in agriculture. 
However, the followers of Prebisch believed that industrialization in the develop- 
ing countries, in Latin America in particular, could only succeed by protecting the 
domestic infant industries. Prospects, furthermore, for manufactured exports were 
considered bleak. Nurkse (1959) believed that foreign markets would not be able 
to absorb growing manufactured exports from the developing countries. This pes- 
simism was expressed again in Cline (1982). Bhagwati (1988) describes how this 
source of export pessimism was supplemented in the 1980s by the argument hat 
increasing manufactured exports from developing countries would find industrial 
countries' markets increasingly sealed off by protection. 
On this basis, many developing countries relied on the domestic home market 
for the development of their industries, protecting these from foreign competition 
through high levels of barriers to imports. 8 
However, various other countries, especially in Asia, did not focus on import 
substitution exclusively but gave an important role to exports to stimulate their 
economic development. 
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2.2. Taxation and protection 
In developing countries the level of protection was shown in Table 3 to decrease 
with rising income per capita. A similar tendency can be shown to exist between 
income per capita and the share of taxes on trade in total government revenue. 
Table 4 shows that in low income countries with a per capita income up to $650 
in 1991, taxes on international trade had a share of almost 30 percent in govern- 
ment revenue, while for upper-middle income countries this figure was only 10 per- 
cent, decreasing further to nearly 2 percent in high income countries. 9 
In a recent review on taxation and development, Stern and Burgess (1993) arrived 
at the same conclusion. In addition it was found from different samples of develop- 
ing countries that the openness of the economy (measured as the share of imports 
in GDP) was correlated positively with the share of import duties in GDP. 
The World Bank (1988) analyzed taxation in developing countries and concluded 
that lack of trained administrative personnel is one of the factors preventing devel- 
oping countries from applying broadly based income or consumption taxes. From 
this perspective, important differences are reported among the administrative costs 
for various types of taxes. For taxes on trade, such administrative costs are calcu- 
lated to range from 1 to 3 percent of the revenue collected. The corresponding 
figures for Value Added Tax can be as high as 5 percent, for personal income taxes 
up to 10 percent. 
Bliss (1992) explains further that the great advantage of tariffs from the point 
of view of administrative feasibility is that in many countries there are only a few 
ports through which traded goods can pass easily. This contrasts with the difficul- 
ties of collecting sales taxes, VAT, and income taxes. 
Yet, the economic costs of trade taxes are higher than those of domestic taxes. 
Economic costs are defined here in terms of the social benefits and costs of re- 
source allocation and changes therein, induced by taxes (World Bank 1988). In 
a case study on the Philippines, the marginal economic costs of raising revenue 
from domestic commodity taxes are close to zero, whereas for revenue from tariffs 
such costs are nearly half the revenue at a tariff of 10 percentwrapidly increasing 
to 2.25 times the revenue at a tariff rate of 25 percent. 
Relative high economic costs of taxes on trade make increased dependence 
on other forms of taxation desirable, but relatively low costs of administration 
Table 4. Taxes on international trade as a percentage of governmental revenue. 
Country Group a Income per Capita in US $ in 1991 1980 1991 
Low-income 80-650 28,6 29.6 
Lower-middle-income 640-2.520 27.6 22.8 
Upper-middle-income 2.530-7.820 13.4 10.1 
High-income 11.120-33.610 2.4 1,5 
Source: Computed from World Bank (1993, Table 12). 
aCountries are included when data are available for 1980 and 1991. Percentages represent unweighted 
averages over countries. 
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prevent this. From this perspective, the IMF (1992) concludes that in countries that 
depend heavily on import taxes, a reform of the domestic tax system is required 
before tariffs can be brought down. 
2.3. Protecting the balance of payments 
Protection in developing countries being higher than in industrial countries re- 
flects also the different roles that import border charges have in these two groups 
of countries. Of primary importance, according to UNCTAD (1990), is the role of 
import charges as a means to protect the balance of payments in developing 
countries, lo 
The IMF (1992) indicates that in the context of inappropriate conomic policies 
and appreciation of the real exchange rate, discretionary import licensing and 
foreign exchange restrictions are used to limit the demand for, and allocate the 
supply of, foreign exchange to cope with chronic balance and payments pressures. 
It is reported that some 80 percent of quantitative restrictions notified to GATT by 
developing countries were justified for balance of payments reasons under Article 
XVIII-B of the GATT. 
More in particular, there is evidence (Whalley 1989), that many developing coun- 
tries have imposed controls on external trade and finance in a cyclical way. ~1 In 
response to the first oil price increases in 1973 and to the subsequent recession, 
and to the debt crisis in the early 1980s, many formerly liberal developing coun- 
tries tightened trade and exchange restrictions. 
Anjaria (1987) analyzed in detail the scope and use of GATT Article XVIII-B enab- 
ling developing countries to apply quantitative trade restrictions on a temporary 
basis to protect their external financial position when facing a deterioration in the 
balance of payments. The Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance of 
Payments Purposes adopted in 1979 at the end of the Tokyo Round broadened 
the scope of Article XVIII (and of Article XII) 12 to include trade meaures other than 
quantitative restrictions, such as import surcharges and advance import deposits. 
Trade measures taken in view of balance of payments difficulties usually will have 
a general character, but article XVIII-B-10 allows variation in the restrictiveness of 
such measures depending on the "essentiality" for economic development of the 
products concerned. 
Two important reasons have recently diminished the usefulness of trade restric- 
tions to remedy balance of payments difficulties (Anjaria 1987). First, in a world 
of floating exchange rates and increased mobility of capital, the use of trade restric- 
tions to improve the balance of payments may be ineffective or even counterproduc- 
tive, as they may induce a compensating appreciation of the currency of the restric- 
ting country. Secondly, there is a growing awareness of the effectiveness of macro- 
economic policy instruments, such as the exchange rate, to deal with balance of 
payments difficulties. 
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2.4. Preferential treatment and the GA TT 
Since World War II, the industrial countries and the developing countries have gone 
different ways in handling their trade policies (Wolf 1987a). The industrial countries 
have engaged in a series of multilateral trade negotiations within the framework 
of GATT and, especially in Europe, they have successfully concluded agreements 
on trade liberalization and economic integration among subgroups of countries. 
As a result, trade policies among the industrial nations have tended to converge. 
Developing countries on the other hand, until recently, largely stood aside from 
the multilateral negotiations. As a consequence, trade policies have diverged from 
those in the industrial countries and also among the developing countries 
themselves. Because trade policies are not bound by the agreements of the GATT 
rounds, the developing countries have generally ended up with a high level of pro- 
tection (see Table 3). 
Yet, developing countries have not been totally absent from GATT activities. Even 
in the late 1940s several of them actively participated in the negotiations on the 
Havana charter, from which the GATT emerged. In 1955, Article XVlll of the GAY'r, 
dealing with government assistance to economic development, was revised. A bal- 
ance of payments provision relating to developing countries was introduced and 
international surveillance over trade restrictions imposed by developing countries 
for balance of payments reasons was loosened, in particular, Article XVIII-B allows 
developing countries to impose quantitative import restrictions when facing balance 
of payments difficulties, 13 with Article XVlII-C incorporating the notion of infant in- 
dustry protection (Anjaria 1987). De Paiva Abreu (1990) points out that the use of 
Article XVIII-B has been easy to the extent that developing countries recently 
resorted only rarely to the use of Article XVIII-C, TM with the consequence that pro- 
tection in developing countries has become very high. 
~n 1966 part iV of the GATT was adopted. Entitled "Trade and Development," 
it obliges industrial GATE-member countries to extend special and differential treat- 
ment to developing countries. Nonreciprocity on the part of developing countries 
was accepted (Wolf 1987b). 
Developing countries had participated in the Kennedy Round of trade negotia- 
tions (1964-1967) only marginally, but more actively in the Tokyo Round (1973-1979). 
The enabling clause was adopted, providing for more favorable treatment as an 
integral part of the GATT system, through such measures as (GATT 1979): 
1. Tariff preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
2. Special treatment for the least developed countries 
3. Strengthening the obligation for industrial countries to refrain from requesting 
concessions from developing countries that are incompatible with their needs 
On the other hand, the clause also states the expectation that developing coun- 
tries will gradually participate more fully in the GATT system of rights and obliga- 
tions as their economic development proceeds. The enabling clause represented 
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a compromise between the developing countries' wish for their preferential status 
to be further legalized under GATT, and the industrial countries' desire that devel- 
oping countries gradually assume responsibilities under GATT on an equal basis 
(Koekkoek 1988). 
In the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-1993), the developing coun- 
tries have played a far more prominent role than in the previous rounds. Of the 
106 countries that started the negotiations, 76 were developing nations.15 Corre- 
spondingly, agriculture and textiles have been included in the final agreement. GATT 
(1993) provides an overview of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, including the 
arrangements for special treatment of the developing countries. 
Regarding market access for agricultural products, nontariff measures are to 
be replaced by tariffs, which in turn are to be reduced in time. For the industrial 
countries this reduction is 36 percent in six years, but for developing countries 
less, namely 24 percent in 10 years, while least developed countries are not re- 
quired to reduce their tariffs. The same figures apply to developed and developing 
countries for the reduction in export subsidies below the level of the 1986-1990 
base period. In general, a special decision sets out provisions for the negative 
effects from liberalization in agriculture on the least developed countries and on 
net food-importing developing countries. 
Integration of textiles and clothing into GATT will be done in three stages cover- 
ing a transition period of 10 years (1995-2005). The agreement focuses largely 
on phasing out the bilateral quotas negotiated under the Multifibre Arrangement 
(MFA). Again, the agreement has provisions for special treatment of the least devel- 
oped countries. 
Special conditions for developing countries, and in some cases for the least 
developed countries, are also included in the agreements on technical barriers to 
trade, on subsidies and countervailing measures, on safeguards, on trade in ser- 
vices, on trade related intellectual property rights, and on the settlement of disputes. 
3. Effects of protection 
3.1. Resource allocation 
Protection against imports has the effect of encouraging firms to enter and pro- 
duce for limited domestic markets, largely insulated from international competition. 
As a result, there is a tendency that these domestic firms operate in too many 
sectors, partly outside the country's comparative advantage, and, consequently, 
on an inefficiently small scale (Thomas and Nash 1991). 
Measures for the effects of protection on resource allocation include the rate 
of effective protection, the domestic resource cost criterion, and the application 
of the true protection concept, to be taken up in the next two sections. 
Associated with protection is a further loss in efficiency of resource allocation. 
Entrepreneurial activities are substituted for by seeking protection or its increase 
and extension, and by obtaining import licences. Such lobbying activities are 
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usually not profitable from a societal point of view. These activities use up real 
resources but do not produce goods or services that enter a utility function of the 
society. For this reason Bhagwati (1982) analyzes such lobbying for increased pro- 
tection under the heading: "Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities (DUP)." 
Earlier, Krueger (1974) used the expression: "rent-seeking activities." 
Protection is likely to have a further effect on the distribution of income. Protect- 
ing production in economic sectors outside a country's comparative advantage 
increases demand for the production factors that are scarce relative to those that 
are abundantly available. This reasoning is reflected in the Stotper-Samuelson 
theorem which postulates that an increase in the relative price of a commodity 
raises the return of the factor used intensively in its production. Bourgignon and 
Morisson (1989) confirm for a sample of 37 developing countries that increasing 
protection is indeed associated with a decreasing share in total income of the poorer 
population groups, who provide predominantly labor. 
Economies maintaining substantial protectionist restrictions become insulated 
from international price movements and other developments on the world market. 
Thomas and Nash (1991) observe that such economies gradually undermine their 
competitiveness, restrict export opportunities, and become very vulnerable to ex- 
ternal shocks that cannot be fended off, leading in turn to serious macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
Salvatore and Hatcher (1991) evaluated the effects of an outward orientation on, 
among others, the efficiency in resource use. To that end, 41 developing countries 
were classified according to four categories of openness on the basis of their trade 
policies in the period 1973-1983: outward oriented (strong or moderate) and inward 
oriented (strong or moderate). One of the findings is support for the thesis that 
industrialization under a strongly inward orientation leads to serious inefficiencies 
that neutralize the positive contribution that industrialization can potentially make 
to the growth of real per capita income and development. 
3.2. Effective protection and domestic resource costs 
Protection increases the opportunities for producing and selling import substitutes 
in a protected market. This in turn is likely to attract additional resources to these 
activities compared to the situation without protection. 
The effective rate of protection (ERP) has been designed to trace such changes 
in resource allocation. The ERP is based on the notion that tariff protection raises 
the price of the product concerned but that this price increase itself provides an 
incomplete measure of the protection offered, for at least two reasons: TM 
1. Tariff protection on output should be weighed against tariffs on inputs. The former 
increases protection; the latter lowers it by increasing the costs of production. 
2. Tariffs and prices are only indirect representations of resource allocation; value 
added does so directly. 
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The ERP combines these two elements. The ERP is calculated as the ratio of 
value added in the case with protection and value added in the case of free trade. 
For sector j this is defined as: 
ERPj = [(1 + tj) - Ei(1 + ti)aij]/[1 - I]i a~j] (1) 
in which a~j represents the intermediate use of product i in the production of j, and 
ti and tj are the corresponding tariff rates. The EP, Pj therefore represents, per unit 
of output j, the increase in total factor rewards due to protection relative to the situ- 
ation of free trade. ~7 
The ERP has been applied widely to evaluate trade policies in developing coun- 
tries (Krueger 1984). Yet, the ERP may not represent additional resources per unit 
of output correctly to the extent that factor prices fail to reflect opportunity costs. 
Subsidies on capital and labor market imperfections are cases in point. 
To remedy this the concept of domestic resource costs (DRC) has been devel- 
oped, in which primary factors of production are valued at opportunity costs by 
the use of shadow prices. ~e For measuring inefficiency in resource allocation, the 
superiority of the DRC criterion over the ERP is well established (Bhagwati 1978). 
Both the ERP and the DRC criteria are typically applied at the industry level in 
a partial equilibrium setting. ~9 With substantial variation in outcome among indus- 
tries, weighing problems arise in deriving conclusions on resource pulls in broader 
sectors (Greenaway and Milner 1987). To that end the concept of true protection 
has been developed, which in addition is set in a general equilibrium framework. 
3.3. True protection: the implicff tax on exports 
The concept of true protection defines the incidence of protection in terms of relative 
price changes in the three broad sectors of an economy (Sjaastad 1980): 
1. Importables 
2. Exportables 
3. Nontradables 2o 
In the analysis it is assumed that importables and nontradables are substitutes 
to some degree both in production and consumption; this is also assumed for 
nontradables and exportables, but importables and exportables are supposedly 
nonsubstitutable. 21
Initially, the tariff raises the price of importables relative to both nontradables 
and exportables. Given a certain degree of substitution this shifts demand away 
from importables toward nontradables and shifts supply in the opposite direction. 
This in turn induces a price rise for nontradables, the extent of which depends 
on the degree of substitutability. Notwithstanding an assumed degree of substi- 
tutability between nontradables and exportables, the price rise of nontradables is 
not thought to trigger a similar process of shifts in demand and supply, leading 
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to a higher internal price of exportables which is assumed to be constant (Clements 
and Sjaastad 1984; Greenaway and Milner 1987). 
As a result, the import tariff leads to a price increase of importables relative to 
exportables and--probably to a lesser degree--to nontradables. The resulting price 
differential between importables and nontradables is probably less than the nominal 
tariff 22 and represents the true protection for the producers of import substitutes. 
From the perspective of producers of exportables, the resulting price differential 
represents a loss in purchasing power and indicates the burden of protection shifted 
to the export sector. In this way import protection is conceived to end up, at least 
partially, as an export tax. 
The implicit tax of import protection on the export sector has three main sources 
(Clements and Sjaastad 1984): 
1. The costs of imported inputs increases. 
2. The protected sectors attract additional resources, raising their prices. 
3. Declining imports result in less purchasing power for the trade partner, lowering 
their capacity to import in turn. 
The true protection calculation framework not only allows the evaluation of im- 
port protection but also of export subsidies and of both at the same time. Both 
policies of import substitution and of export promotion are often applied simultane- 
ously but not necessarily in a coordinated way. The concept of true protection pro- 
vides a framework for a consistent evaluation of both policies and for evaluating 
their net effects. 
Clements and Sjaastad (1984) have applied the true protection concept to eval- 
uate the trade policies in the 1960s and 1970s of six developing countries in Latin 
America. They found that the proportion of import protection that is shifted in the 
form of an implicit export tax varies from 53 to 95 percent, with a mean value of 
the shift parameter of 67 percent. Greenaway and Milner (1987) estimated a shift 
parameter for Mauritius in the period 1976-1982 of 59 percent, and concluded from 
these results that the net effect of the trade policies investigated was a likely pull 
of resources into activities of import substitution and away from the export sector. 
in a similar way, DeRosa (1991) investigated import-restricting policies and their 
effect on the export performance of 23 sub-Saharan countries. The levels of protec- 
tion in sub-Saharan countries are substantially higher than in most other develop- 
ing countries. The figures in Table 5 further indicate that the lowest income coun- 
tries have the highest rates of protection, especially for nontariff barriers. DeRosa 
(1991) reports, furthermore, that sub-Saharan countries maintain escalating tariff 
rates and that protection is directed especially against labor-intensive products. 
A multicommodity model of trade and exchange rate adjustment was used to 
measure the effects of trade liberalization on exports. Trade liberalization was rep- 
resented by a reduction of import duties to a uniform rate of 10 percent and by 
a relaxation of the NTB impact on the volume of imports by 25 percent. ~ The results 
are given in Table 5 and suggest an increase in export earnings of more than 30 
percent per year for all 23 countries, representing 3.5 percent of their GDP, and of 
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Table 5. Import restrictions and estimated effects on exports of trade liberalization in sub-Saharan 
countries, 1987. 
Import Restrictions Effects of Trade Liberalization b 
Volume in % 
Mean Total All NTBs Price 
Tariff Charges Frequency Change c Primary Manu- All 
% % % % Goods factures Goods 
All countries a 29 33 81 34 30 51 33 
Low-income a 30 34 89 39 35 58 37 
Middle-income a 22 30 48 15 11 23 12 
Source: DeRosa (1991). 
a23 sub-Saharan countries; income per capita of $500 per annum is the borderline between low- and 
middle-income countries. 
bTrade liberalization i cludes the reduction of import duties to a uniform rate of 10 percent and a reduction 
in NTB coverage of 25 percent. 
c Price of exports relative to nontraded goods. 
nearly 40 percent per annum for the exports of the low-income countries among 
them. DeRosa (1991) also concluded that simulated import liberalization promotes 
greater proportional expansion of nontraditional, manufactured exports than of tradi- 
tional, primary exports. 
DeRosa (1991) adds however that more robust export performance cannot be 
regained by reforming trade policies alone, but that other policy reforms are needed 
as well. 
3. 4. Experience with trade liberalization 
The costs of protection have their opportunity value in the benefits from trade liber- 
alization. From this perspective, the IMF (1992) observes that, since the mid-1980s, 
many developing countries have pursued structural reforms, including the liberaliza- 
tion of trade policies. However, progress has been uneven across the regions of 
the world. In Latin America, where a strong inward orientation prevailed up to 1985, 
the shift in the orientation of trade policies has been most striking. A rapid elimina- 
tion of quantitative restrictions has been carried out, with subsequent reductions 
in tariffs to low and uniform levels. 24 In contrast, in east and southeast Asia, where 
most countries had relatively open systems since the early 1980s, reforms have 
tended to be gradual. Finally, many countries in Africa and south Asia have not 
yet opened their economies to foreign competition to a significant degree. The IMF 
(1992) observes that reforms are continuing and that more countries are likely to 
adopt open trade systems in the near future. A key feature of these latest reforms 
is that they are part of an integrated package of macroeconomic and structural 
reforms often supported by multilateral institutions. 
A World Bank study edited by Michaely, Papageorgiou, and Choksi (1991) eval- 
uated earlier experience with trade liberalization in the period 1950-1982 in 19 
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developing countries. 2s The experiences of the individual countries leads to some 
general conclusions. Liberalizing countries tend to be countries with a higher per 
capita income than the nonliberalizing ones. Michaely et al. (1991) conclude, fur- 
thermore, that political stability is an important condition for the long-term success 
of trade reform. In connection with this it was found that a period of six years was 
the watershed for liberalization policies very likely to be sustained. 
Thomas, Martin, and Nash (1990) and Thomas and Nash (1991) report on trade 
policy reforms in the period 1979-1987 in 40 developing countries, supported by 
adjustment lending programs. They conclude that the implementation of trade policy 
reforms has been weaker than expected. Four sets of domestic factors constrain- 
ing sustained reform were identified: 
, Vested interests against reform (four countries) 
® Administrative and institutional bottlenecks (three countries) 
• Macroeconomic instability (five countries) 
® Lags in the supply response to policy reforms (especially in low-income coun- 
tries in Africa) 
They also conclude that the sustainability of trade policy reforms is enhanced by: 
• Compensatory measures dealing with short term transitional costs 
• Unternal public commitment o the liberalization policy and the announcement 
of and adherence to a timetable of reforms 
• External commitment o maintain reforms, such as joining the GATT, which raises 
the costs of reversing the reforms 
The IMF (1992) has monitored the most recent experiences with liberalization 
of trade policies in developing countries. The sample of 36 developing countries 
contains major countries in each geographic region with respect to GDP and rep- 
resents about 40 percent of total developing countries' trade in 1985. The 36 coun- 
tries are listed in Appendix 2. 
The trade liberalization evaluated by the IMF (1992) covers: 
e Decontrol, that is, the elimination of NTBs 
• Policies that shift the trade regime toward neutrality, that is, a reduction in the 
bias of incentives toward the production of import substitutes. 26 
In terms of openness, of the 36 developing countries reviewed, the IMF (1992) dis- 
tinguishes four types of trade regimes. The classification of the 36 countries ac- 
cording to these regimes, before and after the trade reforms, is summarized in 
Table 6. 27 Before the reforms, 28 countries out of the total of 36 had a trade regime 
with tight or significant control; after the reform, 25 countries were open to rela- 
tively open. 
"The IMF (1992) underlines that compared with programs of trade reform under- 
taken in earlier periods, the present programs were more frequently designed and 
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Table 6. Trade regimes in 36 developing countries. 
Quantitative Number of Countries 
Restrictions Coverage Tariffs in 
Trade Regime in Percentages a Percentages b Before Reform After Reform 
Tight Control >50 no limit 21 3 
Significant Control 15-50 no limit 7 8 
Relatively Open 5-15 > 50 7 16 
Open < 5 < 50 1 9 
Total - -  - -  36 36 
Source: IMF (1992). 
a Coverage in percentages of total imports under restrictions (in most cases) or of total tariff code items 
(in the remaining cases). 
bTariffs and other import taxes in percentages of the price. 
implemented in the context of comprehensive macroeconomic and structural adjust- 
ment programs. These introduced complementary measures to deregulate product 
and factor markets, to improve the efficiency of the public sector, to improve public 
spending and tax programs, and to attract foreign investment. These measures 
aim to improve the responsiveness of economic agents to changes in relative prices 
and in the climate for private sector investment. In turn, these measures also aim 
at reducing the costs of adjustments arising from trade policy reforms, for instance 
when formerly protected sectors become exposed to import competition. 
In a longer time perspective however, the effects of trade policy reforms turn 
out to be very beneficial. Such evidence is not yet reported on the 36 developing 
countries reviewed, but in this respect the IMF (1992) draws on an earlier study 
of 41 developing countries (IMF 1990). These countries were classified according 
to four degrees of outward orientation and showed striking differences in perfor- 
mance in terms of economic growth and the contribution therein of total factor pro- 
ductivity. The results are summarized in Table 7. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In developing countries the trade-weighted average tariff is 21 percent, the un- 
weighted frequency average of nontariff barriers (NTBs) is 62 percent. Both for 
primary products and for manufactures, average protection comes close to these 
figures for total trade. Within primary products protection on mining products is 
lower than on food products. Within manufactures protection is particularly high 
on clothing, footwear, furniture, and textiles. The UNCTAD therefore concludes that 
the level and structure of protection in developing countries present a barrier to 
the expansion of intradeveloping countries' trade. 
Protection in developing countries has a clear tendency to decrease with the 
level of development. Furthermore, customs receipts in developing countries on 
average are nine times higher than in industrial countries; NTBs have a four times 
higher frequency. 
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Table 7. Trade orientation and growth. 
In Annual Percentages 
Contribution of 
Growth of Total Factor 
Potential GDP Capital Labor Productivity 
Strongly outward-oriented countries 
1975-82 8.4 4.6 1.1 2.7 
1983-89 7.7 3.3 0.7 3.7 
Moderately outward-oriented countries 
1975-82 4.6 2.8 1.3 0.5 
1983-89 4.1 1.7 1.2 1.2 
Moderately inward-oriented countries 
1975-82 4.0 2.6 1,5 -0.1 
1983-89 2.7 1.4 1,5 -0.2 
Strongly inward-oriented countries 
1975-82 2.3 1.6 1.6 -0.9 
1983-89 2.2 0.7 1,6 -0.1 
Source: IMF (1990). 
Note: All figures are unweighted averages. The classification of countries by trade orientation is based 
on World Bank World Development Report, 1987. 
Both in developing countries and in industrial countries tariffs rise with the level 
of processing. As a consequence, the simultaneous reduction of the escalation 
of protection in both groups of countries would be a positive sum game. 
Various explanations apply for the observed tendency of protection to decrease 
with rising income per capita within the group of developing countries as well as 
between the latter and the industrial countries. The share of trade taxes in total 
government revenue has a similar tendency to decrease with higher income per 
capita. Lack of trained administrative personnel is one of the factors preventing 
developing countries from applying broadly based income and consumption taxes. 
In countries that depend heavily on import taxes, a reform of the domestic tax 
system is therefore required before tariffs can be decreased. 
Led by export pessimism, many developing countries relied on the domestic 
home market for the development of their industries, protecting these from foreign 
competition through high levels of barriers to imports. Protection in developing 
countries being higher than in industrial countries reflects also the role of import 
charges as a means of protecting the balance of payments in the former. In addi- 
tion, GATT Article XVlII enables developing countries to apply quantitative trade 
restrictions on a temporary basis to protect their external financial position. 
In general, the GAFF in part IV obliges members to extend special and differential 
treatment o developing countries, and to accept nonreciprocity from them. Also, 
the final agreement of the Uruguay Round includes preferential treatment of devel- 
oping countries in obligations to decrease protection. 
Recently, many developing countries have joined the GATT. Previously, it was 
the industrial countries in particular that engaged in multilateral trade negotiations 
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and concluded free trade agreements among themselves. As a result, trade policies 
in industrial countries converged, but diverged from those in developing countries; 
trade policies also diverged among developing countries. 
Protection against imports has the effect of encouraging firms to enter and pro- 
duce for a limited domestic market, largely insulated from international competi- 
tion. Industrialization under a strongly inward orientation has been shown to lead 
to serious inefficiencies in resource allocation, which neutralize the positive con- 
tribution that industrialization can potentially make to economic development. A 
further loss in efficiency in resource allocation associated with protection is that 
entrepreneurial activities are substituted for by seeking new or additional protec- 
tion against imports. 
Import protection, furthermore, is a burden on the export sector, which cannot 
compensate in its price for increased costs of protected inputs. Evidence shows 
that trade liberalization at the import side can lead to a substantial rise in export 
performance. 
Since the mid-1980s, many developing countries have pursued structural reforms, 
including the liberalization of trade policies. The gains from trade liberalization are 
the opportunity costs of protection. Evidence shows that liberalization of trade has 
important quantitative effects on economic growth and on factor productivity. 
Recent programs of trade liberalization are designed and implemented more 
frequently than before within the context of macroeconomic and structural adjust- 
ment programs. The complementary measures aim to improve the responsiveness 
of economic agents to changes in relative prices and to reduce the costs of ad- 
justments to trade liberalization, and for these reasons, aim at sustaining trade 
policy reforms to be sustained. 
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Notes 
1. The coverage of countries and trade barriers is given in Appendix 1. 
2. This finding is reported to be in contrast with the nature of NTMs applied by industrial countries, 
which would be more targeted to specific trade partner countries and to specific industries (Erzan 
et al. 1989). 
3. Erzan et al. (1989) also point to some exceptions. In cases of products subject to licenses or quotas 
alone, average tariffs were not significantly higher than when such NTMs were not installed. In 
these cases balance of payment considerations may be the prime motivation for restricting imports. 
4. For methodology, sensitivity, and qualifications, see Laird and Yeats (1990). 
5. Tariff escalation in developed economies is reported, for example, in Balassa and Balassa (1984). 
6. Tariff protection includes tariffs and other charges. From NTMs were excluded the general measures, 
that is, measures that are applied for all products; NTMs were represented by nonstach totals, 
that is, even when more than one NTM affects a product it is counted as only one. 
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7. The criteria for the classification are listed in Appendix 2. 
8. In this connection Erzan et al. (1989) found that the level of protection in developing countries 
increases with the size of the population, and thus with one aspect of market size. 
9. UNCTAD (1990) observes that reliance on import taxes for government revenue is particularly strong 
in the least industrialized of the developing countries, where a wide range of imported goods is 
not produced locally and where, therefore, import axes are often similar (in effect) to internal taxes 
in the developed industrial countries. 
10. As a second factor UNCTAD (1990) mentions the role of import charges as a source of government 
revenue, which was taken up in Section 2.2 of this paper. 
11. To absorb some of the fluctuations in export receipts, import bills and capital flows. 
12. GATT Article Xll also permits the use of quantitative r strictions for balance of payments difficulties, 
but with more intensive surveillance by GATT than that connected with Article XVIII-B, which was 
designed especially for developing countries. 
13. See in particular Section 2.3 of this article. 
14. When use of Article XVlII-C was made, however, the World Development Report (World Bank 1987) 
concluded that many developing countries protected their domestic industry well beyond the time 
needed to make infant industries competitive. 
15. Finger and Olechowski (eds.) (1987). During the negotiations the number of participants has in- 
creased. Recent accessions of Fiji, Brunei, and Bahrain have brought he number of Uruguay Round 
participants to 117, among whom are four nonmember participants (GATT Focus, December 1993). 
16. A third reason is of course that only tariff protection is considered; nontariff barriers are not incor- 
porated. On the concept of tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers see Section 3.4. 
17. For various reasons the ERP can be negative as well (Krueger 1984). The measure ERP, in (1) 
represents a simple case. Alternative and more complicated measures have been developed (see, 
e.g., Bulmer-Thomas 1982). 
18. The DRC has different mathematical representations and economic interpretations, the discussion 
of which is outside the scope of this article (Bulmer-Thomas 1982). 
19. Some exceptions are mentioned in Bulmer-Thomas (1982). 
20. In empirical applications importables are represented by products actually imported under existing 
trade policies, exportables by products actually exported, and nontradables by those goods that 
natural and/or artificial protection prevents from being traded internationally (elements and Sjaastad 
1984). 
21. These relations of substitutability are based on the assumption that in terms of relative factor contents, 
the nontradables have an intermediate position between exportables and importables (Greenaway 
and Milner 1987). 
22. When nontradables and importables are perfect substitutes the price increase in both sectors will 
be the same in the end. Likewise, when exportables and nontradables are perfect substitutes, the 
price differential with importables will be the same in the end for both sectors. 
23. A relaxation with 10 percent represents the other scenario reported in DeRosa (1991). 
24. Quantitative Restrictions and, in general, NTBs are far more damaging than tariffs. NTBs fragment 
the market and block the forces of specialization i  the market. Tariffs, on the other hand, increase 
the price but leave the signaling functioning of prices in tact and are therefore a market-conforming 
instrument of protection. In this sense is the tariff equivalence of NTBs a misleading concept. 
25. This large World Bank project resulted in seven volumes, six of which contain the 19 country studies 
prepared by 32 authors. Michaely et al. (1991) is the seventh volume and presents an overview 
of the findings. 
26. The concept of neutrality of incentives between the export sector and the sector producing import 
substitutes is explained in Bhagwati (1988). 
27. The structure of trade policies after the reform in the 36 developing countries is represented in 
detail in Appendix 2. 
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Appendix 1: Trade control measures in developing countries 
The data on the extent of trade control measures in developing countries, as 
displayed in Tables 1 and 3 in the main text, are derived from the report by the 
UNCTAD secretariat: Trade Expansion among Developing Countries: Constraints 
and Measures to Overcome Them (UNCTAD, TD/B/1260, Geneva, 1990). The aggre- 
gate statistics for the developing countries as a group are derived from the data 
for individual developing countries in the Handbook of Trade Control Measures of 
Developing Countries, 1987 (UNCTADIDIDMMIMisc. 2/GE.89-55071, Geneva, 1989. 
Country Coverage 
The Handbook (UNCTAD 1989) contains data on trade measures on the following 
developing countries: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, 
Costa Rica, C6te d'lvoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, (Democratic People's Re- 
public of) Korea, (Republic of) Korea, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Repub- 
lic, (United Republic of) Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, 
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Trade Control Measures 
The Handbook (UNCTAD 1989) reports for each of the developing countries on 
the extent of the following trade control measures: 
1. Tariffs 
2. Additional Charges 
3. Nontariff measures 
. Tariffs include customs duties and fiscal duties. Preferential rates were discarded 
and the lowest of the remaining rates applied was taken as the tariff rate re- 
ported. Since data on imports at the tariff lines of the national classification 
are usually lacking, simple averages were used to arrive from tariffs at national 
tariff lines to mean tariff rates at each heading of the Customs Cooperation Coun- 
cil Nomenclature (CCCN). From there, import-weighted averages were used 
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to arrive at tariff rates of product categories of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC). Average tariffs for total trade and across countries again 
were import-weighted averages. 
2. Additional charges include customs surcharges and surtaxes, stamp tax, cer- 
tain other fiscal charges, and tax on foreign exchange transactions. Excluded 
are taxes such as sales tax, which are levied on imports and domestic produc- 
tion alike. Excluded are taxes on services actually rendered such as statistical 
tax and port tax. Certain other charges such as license fees and consular in- 
voice fees are also excluded because of lack of consistent data. The average 
procedure is as with tariffs. 
3. Nontariffmeasures (NTMs) include quantitative restrictions (QRs) in the form of 
• Licenses: discretionary licenses, import authorizations, licenses for selected 
purchasers 
• Quotas: global quotas 
• Prohibitions: total prohibition, temporary prohibition, suspension of issuance 
of licenses 
in addition, such measures as advance import deposits, foreign exchange restric- 
tions, fixed customs valuations and state trading monopolies were also considered. 
NTMs are expressed as frequency ratios. Unweighted frequency averages were 
used to arrive at NTM-coverage from the national tariff lines to the CCCN headings 
and from there to the SITC categories, to total imports, and to averages over coun- 
tries. At the national tariff lines the frequency of NTM was taken as 0% if no NTM 
was applied at that tariff line, as 50% if an NTM affected part of the products speci- 
fied at that tariff line, and as 100% if all the products specified were affected by 
one or more NTM. 
Appendix 2: Current structure of developing country trade regimes 
The IMF (1992) reports on a review of the trade policy reforms in 36 major developing 
countries in each geographic region. This appendix classifies the 36 countries 
under four headings according to the characteristics of their trade policies after 
the reform. 
Table A 1. 
Country 
Most Tariffs and Surcharges 1 
Recent 
Year of Statutory Tariff Charges 
Reform (in percent) (in percent) 
Quantitative Restrictions 
Main Measure 
Coverage 3 
(in percent) 
Tight Control 
india 1990 0-295 0-78 
Nepal 1989 5-100 0-105 
Tanzania 1990 0-60 0-50 
Significant Control 
Bangladesh 1990 0- > 100 
Cameroon 1991 0-100 5-10 
Malawi 1991 0-45 0-85 
Morocco 1989 0-45 0-13 
Nigeria 1989 0-200 7 
Nonautomatic licensing 
Nonautomatic licensing 
FX allocation 
Prohibitions 
Nonautomatic licensing 
Nonautomatic licensing 
Nonautomatic licensing 
Prohibitions 
70 
>50 
>50 
244,5 
15-50 
176 
224 
214 
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Table A 1. Continued. 
Country 
Most Tariffs and Surcharges 1 
Recent 
Year of Statutory Tariff Charges 
Reform (in percent) (in percent) 
Quantitative Restrictions 
Main Measure 
Coverage 3
(in percent) 
Pakistan 1991 0-95 0-15 
Tunisia 1990 0-43 15-30 
Zambia 1990 15-50 0-20 
Relatively Open 
Brazil 1991 0-65 
Colombia 1991 0-63 0-'1- 6 
C6te d'lvoire 1987 5-30 0-12 
Ecuador 1991 5-35 
Indonesia 1990 0-40 0-40 
Jamaica 1988 0-60 . . .  
Kenya 1991 0-100 . . .  
Malaysia 1989 . . .  
Peru 1991 1;-25 
Philippines 1989 10-50 0-25 
Senegal 1991 15-45 10-50 
Sri Lanka 1990 5-50 . . .  
Thailand 1990 0-100 
Trinidad and Tobago 1991 5-45 0-60 
Venezuela 1991 0-20 
Zai~e 1986 0-50 0-23 
Open 
Argentina 1991 0-22 0-4 
Bolivia 1988 5-10 1-2 
Chile 1988 151° 5-20 
Costa Rica 1990 1-40 0-18 
Gambia, The 1991 0-23 
Ghana 1988 0-25 0-23 
Korea 1990 1-50 . . .  
Mexico 1988 0-20 
Uruguay 1985 0-45 0-'5 
Prohibitions 
Nonautomatic licensing 
FX allocation 
214,7 
3O 
15-5O 
14 
144 
74 
154 
154 
7 
6 
5 
5 
84 
84 
94 
84,8 
09 
10 
8 
44 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
4 
2 
0 
Sources: international Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restric- 
tions; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Notes: 
FX = foreign exchange. Countries are classified based on the following criteria. In regimes with tight and 
significant control, quantitative restrictions (QRs) cover more than 50 percent or between 15 percent and 50 
percent of imports, respectively. Relatively open regimes have QRs covering 5-15 percent of imports of QRs 
covering less than 5 percent of imports and maximum tariffs and charges that exceed 50 percent. An open 
regime has tariffs and other import taxes not greater than 50 percent and QRs covering less than 5 percent 
of imports. No allowance has been made for differences in the administration of QRs or the structure of tariffs, 
which may also affect the degree of restrictiveness of the trade system. 
i When available, a range of tariffs is used. If not available, the unweighted average of statutory rates or 
an average effective rate was used. Very high rates applied to only one or two items have been excluded. 
Charges that were applied equally to domestic and imported goods have also been excluded. 
2Quantitative restrictions include value limitations on imports through foreign exchange allocation or through 
the requirement that importers provide their own foreign exchange. 
3percent of total imports covered by all quantitative restrictions unless otherwise specified. 
4In percent of total tariff code items. 
5Includes right-of-refusal items. 
6 Includes foreign exchange licensing and prior approval lists. 
7The restricted list covers 283 tariff lines and the banned list covers 818 items out of a total of 5,355. Reduc- 
tions were undertaken in both categories after April 1991. 
8 Refers to 1989. 
9Target, end of 1991. 
1° Uniform tariff. 
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